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California's 1967 Therapeutic Abortion
Act: Abridging A Fundamental
Right To Abortion
This comment examines the Therapeutic Abortion Act from
three major perspectives: how has the law been applied in California since 1967; does a woman have a fundamental right to have
an abortion; what is the state's interest in regulating abortions?
A review of some recent lower court decisions helps to illuminate
the latter two questions. Recent statistical data demonstrates
that the rate of legal abortions is increasing dramatically. Also
included is a comparison of recent abortion laws enacted by
other states.
Thus is the Judaeo-Christian ethic of reverence for life replaced
by an ethic of reverence for welfare, convenience or happiness. It
is ironic that the proposals for liberalizing abortion laws are made
by a generation that is reconsidering and often abandoning capital
punishment.'
Prior to the enactment of California's Therapeutic Abortion Act in
1967, the California abortion law was contained in four sections of the
Penal Code. The main section, 274, stated:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to any woman,
or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug, or substance
or uses or employs any instrument or other means whatever, with
intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless
the same is necessary to preserve her life, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than two nor more than five
years. (Emphasis added.)2
Pursuant to this law, an abortion was legal only if necessary to preserve the life of the mother. In 1967, California, along with several
1 Louisell, Abortion The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233, 248 (1969).
2

This section, enacted in 1872, remained substantially unchanged from the origi-

nal enactment as part of California's first penal code (CAL. STATS. 1850, c. 99, § 45, p.

233); § 275 stated that a woman who solicits or submits to an abortion is punishable
by up to five years imprisonment; § 276 provided that any person wio solicits a
woman to submit to an abortion is punishable by up to five years imprisonment; and
§ 182 is the general conspiracy section of the California Penal Code proscribing conspiracy to commit any crime.
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other states, 3 enacted a Therapeutic Abortion Act 4 based upon the

American Law Institute's recommendations in its Model Penal Code. 5
This act substantially modified California's 1 17-year-old abortion law

and was enacted only after considerable national controversy and seven
years of study by the California Legislature." Essentially, the Act permits termination of pregnancy when there is a "substantial risk that the
continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother,"7 or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.8 However, there are additional requirements. The termination

may be performed only: (1) in hospitals accredited by the Joint Committee of Accreditation of Hospitals,9 (2) when a committee of the hospitars medical staff (consisting of at least two or three licensed physi-

cians and surgeons) affirmatively determines there is a substantial risk
to the mother's physical or mental health,'" and (3) the termination is
approved before the 20th week of pregnancy." Mental health as defined in the Act "means mental illness to the extent that the woman is
dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others or is in need
2
of supervision or restraint."'
The foremost purpose of the Act was to control, rather than foster as
did the old law, illegal abortions. 13 In his statement of purpose of the

Act before the Senate Judiciary Committee, April 27, 1967, Senator
Beilenson said:
The existing law is barbaric because we force women and girls,
who could be given expert medical attention by their own physicians, to seek out the services of quacks and criminal abortionists,
Colorado was first, followed closely by North Carolina and then California.
This was an act to add Chapter 11 (§ 25950-25954) to Division 20 of the
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, to amend § 2377 of the CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, and
to amend §§ 274, 275, and 276 of the CAL. PEN. CODE (CAL. STATS. 1967, c. 327, § 1,
3
4

p. 1535).

5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), § 230.3(2) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
6 See, Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 285 (1966).
For a brief review of the history of the California Act, see Leavy and Charles, California's New Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Analysis and Guide to Medical and Legal
Procedure, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, nn.2, 3 (1967).
7 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951(c)(1).
8 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25952(c) (2). This paper makes no attempt
to discuss this section of the Therapeutic Abortion Act, since the section applies
to only 3% of the therapeutic abortions performed. See DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA THERAPEUTIC ABORTION ACT 6 (January, 1970). [Hereinafter cited as PUBLIC HEALTH RE-

PORT]. This report may be obtained by writing to Bureau of Maternal and Child
Health, 2151 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, California 94704.
9 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (a).
10 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25951 (b), 25953.
11 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25953.
12 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25954.
13 Note, The California Therapeutic Abortion Act; An Analysis, 19 HAST. L.J.
242-243 (1967).
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or to try to abort themselves-and we drive thousands of women

14
to their deaths and to serious injury each year.
A secondary purpose of the Act was to bring California's abortion law

into line with the advances made in medical practice and social ideology

in the last several years. 15
In 1970, Senator Beilenson, introduced a bill which would have repealed the Therapeutic Abortion Act. 1 6 The proposed legislation would

further have provided that present penalties pertaining to inducing miscarriages would have been inapplicable in situations where such actions

were directed or performed by a licensed physician and surgeon and the
action was performed not later than the 20th week of pregnancy.
The effectiveness of the Therapeutic Abortion Act in reducing the
number of illegal abortions is not determinable since, obviously, there
has never been a system to record the illegal acts. 17 However, current
data compiled by the State Department of Public Health demonstrates

the impact of the law.' s
The liberalized abortion law started slowly; however, the number of

legal abortions has steadily increased. The ratio of therapeutic abortions to live births in California for 1968 was 15 for each 1,000.1'
This low figure has motivated critics to conclude that even with the lib-

eralized law, there remained a substantial number of illegal abortions in
California.

The rate rose to 35 therapeutic abortions per 1,000 live births
for the
first nine months of 1969. In September of 1970, the Department of
Public Health released unofficial figures for the first six months of 1970,
14 A copy of the statement may be obtained by writing to Senator A. C. Beilenson, State Capitol, Sacramento, California.
15 Id. Senator Beilenson stated:
Our proposed change . . . would bring the law into conformity with the substantial body of medical judgment and public opinion which supports termination of pregnancies in cases which are illegal under current law.
160 S.B. 544, 1970 Regular Session. The bill failed to achieve sufficient votes
to pass the Senate Judiciary Committee, June 30, 1970. (Aug. 21-From Committee
without further action. Senate Weekly History 1970). Senator Beilenson plans to
introduce a similar bill in 1971. (Telephone interview with Senator Beilenson's office,
Sept. 14, 1970).
17 See PUBLIc HEALTH REPORT 5. The Public Health notes a recent study of
North Carolina cities where the researchers used a "randomized response" household
survey method and provided anonymity to the respondent on sensitive questions.
From the responses the researchers estimated that the number of women (ages 18-44)
aborted each year, either legally or illegally, was 34.2 per 1,000 women. Despite the
questions of the integrity of the sample, the survey techniques, or the demographic comparability, the Department of Public Health applied the North Carolina ratio to California and estimated the total number of abortions in California to be
81,600 in 1968. The Department then concluded that 76,600 were illegal and that the
recorded 4,496 therapeutic abortions accounted for only 6% of the total number of
abortions in 1968.
18 PUBLIc HEALTH REPORT.

19 Id. at 2.
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showing that the number of therapeutic abortions rose during those
months to approximately 24,000. On the basis of this increase, the
Department estimates the total number of therapeutic abortions for 1970
will reach over 50,000.20
Though it is still difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the Act toward eliminating illegal abortions the rate of legal abortions has increased significantly since the first year of enactment. Further, when
one considers that the abortion rate is no higher in some countries with
liberal abortion laws than it is in California, 2 1 it appears reasonable to

conclude that the therapeutic abortion law, has not been totally ineffective in curtailing illegal abortions. 2
Perhaps these most recent statistics will reduce the strong criticism
and skepticism concerning the practicability of the 1967 Act. Doubtlessly they will cause little restraint of those who have campaigned for a
more liberal abortion law. But even if the present Act was deemed by
these critics to be an acceptable solution to the abortion question in
California its future remains uncertain. It is the judiciary who has now
cast a menacing shadow across the Act.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE

1967

ABORTION ACT

The issue of the constitutionality of the Therapeutic Abortion Act
has been tried in lower courts and presumably will be ruled upon by the
California Supreme Court within a year or tvo. Also, the United
States Supreme Court has heard arguments on the constitutionality of
the District of Columbia abortion law (similar to the old California
Penal Code section 274), and may shortly hand down a decision affecting the constitutionality of all state abortion laws, including California's
1967 Act.
The issues by now are fairly clear-cut. There are five grounds on
which the constitutionality of any abortion law may be attacked. These
20 Telephone interview on October 5, 1970, with the Bureau of Maternal and
Child Health, California Department of Public Health, Berkeley, California. The
ratios for some of the foreign countries with more liberal abortion laws are: Japan, 912
per 1,000; Czechoslovakia, 344 per 1,000; and Hungary, 256 per 1,000.
21 See note 20 supra.
22 One further indicator of the effectiveness of the act is the numbers of maternal deaths which resulted from other than abortions pursuant to the Therapeutic
Abortion Act. In the years 1966-1967 there were 35 reported deaths due to criminal
or self-induced abortions. In the years 1968-1969 there were 22 such deaths reported. One does not know whether this is a reduction corresponding to the increase
in the number of therapeutic abortions performed during the same period, or a normal
yearly variation on which the Therapeutic Abortion Act has had little effect. Also,
information on adoptions and maternity admittances is sketchy and too dated to be of
value to this analysis; therefore, no attempt is made to show whether the number of
babies available for adoption and the number of maternity admittances have decreased,
remained constant, or increased since the passage of the Therapeutic Abortion Act.
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include vagueness, overbreadth, lack of compelling state interest in the

regulation of a fundamental right, unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, and lack of equal protection.

The first case to provide a

definitive review of these issues as they relate to abortion law was
People v. Belous, decided by the California Supreme Court in Septem-

ber, 1969.23 As a result of the thorough arguments presented by both
parties and various amici curiae, 4 and the careful reasoning of the
court, the opinion develops some important guidelines to apply for further determination of the constitutionality of abortion laws.
In the Belous case, Dr. Belous, a prominent Los Angeles obstetrician
and gynecologist,2 5 referred a girl to a doctor from Mexico, unlicensed
in California, who performed an abortion on her in this state. The re-

sult of the case hinged on Dr. Belous' ability to prove the abortion was
necessary to preserve the woman's life as required by Penal Code section 274. The court admitted into evidence the defendant's offer of

proof that he was convinced the girl's very life was in danger, either
from possible "butchery in Tijuana or from self-mutilation." 20
Dr. Belous was convicted in the lower court and the case was appealed
to the California Supreme Court. Based on two lower court decisions
interpreting the words "necessary to preserve the life of," 27 the court
found that the words of Penal Code section 274 did not impart a sufficiently clear meaning to "men of common intelligence. ' 28 The words

"necessary to preserve" could range in meaning all the way from maintaining the status quo to preventing only biological death. 29 Consequently the court found the 100 year old statute void for vagueness.
A second constitutional concept was also discussed by the court as a
23 People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d -,
80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Sept. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as Belous]. Cited pages refer to 80 Cal. Rptr.
24 Belous at 355.
25 Id.
20 Id. at 356.
27 People v. Albarbanel, 239 Cal. App. 2d 31, 32, 35 (1965); People v. Ballard,
218 Cal. App. 2d 295, 298 (1963); and People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 807
(1959). The Court also held (Belous at 359) two other jurisdictions to be in accord:
State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 221 N.W. 592, 596 (1928), and State v. Hatch,
138 Minn. 317, 164 N.W. 1017 (1917).
For a contra view of the construction found by the Belous court in the cases cited,
see Comment, To Be or Not to Be: The Constitutional Question of the California
Abortion Law, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 643 (1970).
28 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939), as cited in Belous at 357,
358:
No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes . . . . [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law.
The court also cited a California case, People v. McCaughan, 49 Cal. 2d 409, 414
(1957).
29 Belous, at 358.
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basis for holding the statute unconstitutional, i.e., an improper delegation of decision-making power to a directly-involved individual con30
trary to the fourteenth amendment.
At present, there are two aspects to a finding of unconstitutional delegation of decision-making power. One aspect is represented by the
case of Tumey v. Ohio.3 In that case a village mayor was allowed to
receive his costs (besides his regular salary) in each case he heard involving violation of state prohibition law if the accused was convicted.

The court found that such a grant of power to an individual who had a
"direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome of his
own decision is an unconstitutional delegation of power because it violates the due process clause of the Constitution.3 2
The second aspect of an unconstitutional delegation of power is represented by the case of Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.3"
This case concerned the constitutionality of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Among other issues discussed was the improper
delegation of legislative power resulting from an absence of definite
guidelines for the agency to whom Congress had delegated the power.
Though the holding of the case was later limited in the interstate commerce field by subsequent cases,3 4 it and the Carter case have continued to be authority for holdings by state supreme courts on issues of unconstitutional delegation of state power to state agencies because of no
definite guidelines. 35
While the Belous court did not specifically discuss the latter aspect
of unconstitutional delegation of power (except to say the statute was
void for vagueness), it did discuss the former. The court held that the
doctor under the 1872 abortion law has a "direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest" in denying a woman an abortion because there is no
penalty if the doctor wrongly denies the abortion; only if he wrongly
grants one.3 6 In other words, the possibility of a felony conviction, with
resultant.jail sentence and loss of license,3 7 gives the doctor a substantial
pecuniary interest in not granting an abortion. It has been argued that
30

Id. at 366.

31

273 U.S. 510 (1927).

32
33

Id. at 523.

295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.- 238 (1936).

34 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
35 See State Board of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, Inc., 40 Cal. 2d

436, 448 (1953); and Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal. 2d 228,
235-236 (1962). See also GELLHERN & BYSE, ADMImSTRATIVE LAW, 143-144 (1960);
Comment, The Void for Vagueness Rule in California,41 CALIF. L. REV. 523, 529, 532
(1953).
36 Belous 366.
37 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2377.
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the doctor might have a pecuniary interest in granting the abortion in
order to obtain the fee.3 8 However, it is questionable that the expec-

tancy of a cash fee could ever outweigh the pecuniary loss from a jail
sentence and deprivation of his right to practice medicine.

Therefore,

with the scales of the physician's pecuniary interest so weighted, might
not his usual decision tend to deprive a woman of an abortion when she
might otherwise be entitled to one-when, under the old code section, a
live birth might physically or mentally destroy her? The court thought
so. Such a delegation of decision-making power to an individual with
a direct, pecuniary interest, the court found, was unconstitutional as a
violation of due process. 39

Besides the vagueness finding, however, the primary importance of
the Belous case lies in its delineation (for the first time in a constitu-

tional case) of the fundamental right of a woman to decide whether or
not to bear children. The discussion of this right absorbed the court
for over two-thirds of its opinion.4 0 Having first found the statute void
for vagueness, the court went on to say that even if there had not been
a void-for-vagueness finding, the law would still be unconstitutional

because it works an invalid infringement of a woman's fundamental
rights under the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
The rights involved, the court found, are the right of the woman to life
and the right of the woman to choose whether or not to bear children.
A finding of the latter right might be considered a weakness of the case,
since there is no direct precedent for such a result. 4 ' However, the right

of a woman to abortion before "quickening", was recognized for centuries at English common law.4- The Belous holding on the funda38 See 118 U. PA. L.
39 Belous 366.

Rv. supra note 27, at 657.

Seven pages out of a total of eleven for the majority opinion.
Yet the court cited as precedent a long list of cases (e.g., Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 500 (1965); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); and Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 715) as authority for the
fact that the fundamental right of a woman to choose whether to bear children "follows from the Supreme Court's and this court's repeated acknowledgment of a 'right
of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters related to marriage, family, and sex." (Belous 360).
40
41

For authority "that such a right is not enumerated in either the United States or
California Constitutions is no impediment to the existence of the right," the court cited:
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500, 505-506 (1964); and Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 602 (1966), among others.
The court also said: "It is not surprising that none of the parties who have filed
briefs in this case have disputed the existence of this fundamental right." (Belous 360).
42 See PERKINS, ON CRIMINAL LAW 139-149 (2d ed. 1969). At common law,
abortion was not punished as murder, but as a misdemeanor, the majority saying a
crime was committed only if the fetus had reached the "quickening" stage of gestation.
"Quickening" was regarded as the time at which the mother first felt life. "Viability",
the point at which a fetus can live independently of the mother, was not a concept at
common law. See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the
Studies of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y. LAW
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mental right of a woman to abortion may be an example of what Mr.
Justice Harlan describes as lack of "judicial self-restraint," because the
43
court is defining a right not specifically mentioned in the constitution.
Yet the finding of the right to choose whether or not to bear children,
novel to judicial history, has become precedent for the existence of that
right in subsequent holdings. 44 After announcing the fundamental
rights the court then discussed the possible limitations on those rights.
In other words, did there exist a compelling state interest in regulating
the rights of the woman to life and to choose whether or not to bear children? 5 The court found that while there was a compelling interest in
1872, in preserving the woman's life from the grave dangers of abortion
in that era, that medical expertise regarding abortion has so greatly
progressed that today legal abortion is less dangerous to a woman's health

than a live birth.40 Therefore, there is no longer a compelling interest of
the state in proscribing abortion to protect the mother's health. On the
contrary, the menace of illegal abortions, with the attendant high incidence of critical infection, death, or subsequent infertility and pelvic

disease, 47 would appear to give the state a compelling interest in liberalizing legal abortions.
Three additional arguments suggesting a compelling state interest in

regulating abortion-protection of the father's rights, suppression of
FORM 411, 424 (1968).
For a history of abortion see Comment, Abortion Law Reform at the Crossroads?
46 CHIc. KENT L. REv. 102 (1969); Means, 14 N.Y. LAw FORUM 411, supra; or Abortion, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING ABORTION Now
4 (Guttmacher ed. 1967).
43 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501-502 (1965) (Mr. Justice Harlan,
concurring).
44 A discussion of two cases citing Belous as precedent will follow infra.
While it has been suggested that the court's finding on this point was mere dicta,
Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 HAST. L. REV. 51,
65 (1970), or only a secondary ratio decidendi (see note 27 supra 118 U. PA. L. REV.
at 649-652), one might argue that a conclusion as to dicta or ratio decidendi is no
longer relevant. The trend of subsequent decisions and the more recent state laws is
to grant greater protection to the right of the woman to choose whether or not to bear
children. See text infra.
45 Precedent for the necessity of a compelling state interest in order to regulate
a fundamental right is abundant. The court cited: Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
40 Belous 361, n.7. In this note the court referred to three recent studies of
abortion in European countries noting that there was no comparable data in the
United States, but that in the first year of the Therapeutic Abortion Act there were
almost 4,000 legal abortions reported without a maternal death.
The only data contrary to the conclusion above was from Sweden where maternal
mortality from abortion was slightly higher than from giving birth, but that figure was
explainable by the fact that abortions in Sweden are often performed during late pregnancy.
47 Belous cites Kistner, Medical Indications for Contraception: Changing Viewpoints (editorial) 25 OBS'r. & GYNEC. 285, 286 (1965); KLEEGMAN & KAUFMAN, INFERTrLrrY IN WOMAN 301 (1966); and CuRTis & HuFFMAN, GYNECOLOGY 564-566 (6th
ed. 1950), as authority on this subject. See also numerous authorities cited in Belous,
at 361-362, nn.9, 10.
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promiscuity48 and maintaining population growth 49 -were never discussed by the court. But protection of the rights of the fetus, by far the

most compelling reason for proscription of abortion today, was given
startling treatment. Citing various California code sections, 0 the common law, 51 and cases regarding wrongful death, inheritance and tort recoveries, 52 the court first concluded that the rights of the fetus or embryo 3 are not equivalent to the rights of a child born alive. For example, the intentional destruction of a child born alive is murder or
manslaughter, 54 while "the intentional destruction of an embryo or fetus
is never treated as murder, and only rarely as manslaughter."'5 Usu-

ally it is treated as the lesser offense of abortion. The court concluded

that the mother's right to life always takes precedence over any interest
the state may have in the unborn9
Such a conclusion shocks the conscience of those who believe that

human life begins at conception.5" To allow life, already begun, to be
legally cut off at the whim of individuals is to deny reverence for life.
If one finds human life so burdensome in its early stages that there is

justification in destroying it, at what point is there justification for destroying it in its later stages? When a man can no longer walk? When
he is 75, or 80? When he can no longer take care of himself? It is on
this point that the religious tenets of Christianity and Judaism, so basic a
factor in the development of our society, exert a force in opposition to
48 See Means, The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L. FoR. 411,
428-434 (1968), for a discussion of United States cases relevant to the father's right.
See also O'Beirne v. Superior Court, 1 Civ. 25174 (Sup. Ct. of Cal., Dec. 6, 1967); Los
Angeles Herald-Examiner, Dec. 6, 1967, at A-20, cols. 1-3, for denial by the courts of
a father's right under the Therapeutic Abortion Act. For a point of view favoring
the father's right, see Louisell and Carroll, The Father as Non-Parent, 210 CATHOLIC
WORLD 108 (1969). See also Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 301 (1970).
49 See Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis, 27 OHIo ST. L.J.
647, 652 (1966).
10 CAL. CIV. CODE § 29; CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 250, 255; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 3705
and 3706.
51 See note 47 supra.
52 Belous 363, n.12. The court cited one case in footnote 13, p. 363, contra to
its position, People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 624, 626 (1947). For other cases
contra see PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (3d ed. 1964). However,
one recent Federal District Court case in accord with Belous is Henry v. Jones, 306
F. Supp. 726 (D.C. Mass. 1969).
53 Belous does not distinguish between the term "embryo", usually applied to the
early stages of gestation, and "fetus", applied to the later stages, usually after the
third month of development. See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED Di rTONARY (2d ed. 1960).
54 PERKINS, ON CRIMINAL LAW supra note 42, at 140.
55 Belous, at 362.
56 Id.
57 See Drinan, Morality of Abortion Laws, 14 JB. GEST. CATHOLIc LAW 190
(1968); Noonan, The Constitutionality of the Regulation of Abortion, 21 HAST. L.
REv. 51 (1970); Louisell, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 233 (1969); Jakobovits, Jewish Views on Abortion, ABORTION AND
THE LAVW, 124, 125, 126 (1967). Cf. Hellegers, Law and the Common Good, COmMONWEAL 418 (June 30, 1967).
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liberalization of abortion laws.58
Another California case, subsequent to Belous, acknowledged much
greater awareness of the right of the fetus. In Keeler v. Superior
Court"0 decided by the Third District Court of Appeal two months
after the Belous decision, Justice Friedman, denying Keeler's writ of prohibition to stay his prosecution on a murder charge for the killing of a
viable fetus, interpreted the Belous "dictum" on the rights of the fetus
narrowly, and held that "a fetus which has reached the stage of viability
is a human being for the purpose of California's honicide statutes."6
On appeal, 61 the California Supreme Court was presented with an
extreme example of the possible effect of its reasoning in Belous. The
facts involved a couple who were divorced in September, 1968. At the
time Mrs. Keeler was pregnant by another man but concealed the fact
from her husband. In February, 1969, Keeler confronted his ex-wife
outside her automobile, confirmed the fact that she was pregnant, and
in an effort to "stomp it out," shoved his knee in her abdomen. In the
subsequent Caesarian section, the fetus, weighing five pounds and at
least in the eighth month of development, was found with a severely
62
fractured skull and was delivered stillborn.
Consistent with the Belous case, and contrary to the holding of the

Third District Court of Appeal, the court held in a 5-2 decision that the
intentional destruction of an eight-month-old fetus capable of independent life was not murder. 63 Immediately the Republican Majority Leader
of the California Assembly announced that he would introduce a special measure in the legislature making such an offense the crime of
64
murder.
Though the Belous decision held the 1872 statute unconstitutional
on the rather technical, narrow, and disputed ground that it was void for
vagueness, the importance of the case rests in its discussion for the first
time of the fundamental right of a woman to choose whether or not to
bear children and what interests, if any, the state might have in limiting
58 For his dissent in Belous, Justice Burke, with whom Justices McComb and
Sullivan concurred, quoted the following passage from Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal.
App. 2d 629, 634 (1939):
The respondent asserts that the provisions of section 29 of the Civil Code are
based on a fiction of law to the effect that an unborn child is a human being
separate and distinct from its mother. We think that assumption of our statute is not a fiction, but upon the contrary that it is an established and recognized fact by science and by everyone of understanding.
59 276 A.C.A. 324, 80 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1969).
60 Id. at 330; 80 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
61 2 Cal. 3d 619 (1970).
62

Id. at 623-624.

63 Id. at 628.

64 In an interview with Assemblyman Biddle's office in June, 1970, his staff
confirmed the fact that Assemblyman Biddle has every belief his bill, A.B. 816, will
pass the legislature, if not in 1970, then in a subsequent session of the legislature.
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that right. The court's finding of no compelling state interest in protecting the rights of the fetus, on the other hand, has not found support in
subsequent decisions or recently enacted state law. 65 The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court but denied certiorari,"0
perhaps because the court felt either that the issue had not yet "ripened"! or that the issue was one best left to the states to solve as they
saw fit."
Two months after the Belous decision was rendered, United States
District Court Judge Gesell, in United States v. Vuitch, 9 cited Belous
as precedent for its holding that the federal abortion law for the District
of Columbia (essentially the same as the 1872 California law) 70 was
unconstitutional for vagueness and for impinging to an-appreciable extent on significant constitutional rights of the individual. 7' In Vuitch,
a licensed physician and a nurse's aid, both charged with abortion in unrelated cases, moved for dismissal on grounds that the federal statute
violated the due process clause. The court granted the dismissal in the
case of the physician, but not in the case of the nurse's aid. It held that
the words of the statute "under the direction of a physician" were a legitimate use of the police power because the government had a compelling interest in protecting the health of the mother.7
The higher incidence of infection and complications in abortions performed by other
than licensed physicians justified the law in regard to the nurse's aid.7 3
As to the physician, however, besides finding unconstitutionally vague
the words "necessary to preserve the life and health of the mother," the
court also held the right of privacy 74 "may well include the right to remove an unwanted child at least in the early stages of pregnancy." (Emphasis added.)75 It is apparent from the words emphasized in this statement that Judge Gesell's opinion did not go as far as the California Supreme Court in limiting the rights of the fetus. He implied, though he
did not set any time limit, that Congress should study the possibility of
some limitation on abortion in the later stages of pregnancy.70
65 In Maryland, New York, Alaska, and Hawaii.
66 Cert. denied, -U.S. -, Feb. 24, 1970.
67 See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles,

331 U.S. 459 (1947);
Lathrop v. Donohue, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
08 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
opiniop); see also Mr. Justice Harlan's view in Griswold v. Connecticut, supra note 43.
69 305 F. Supp. 1032 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as uMtch]. The United
States Supreme Court agreed on April 27, 1970, to hear full arguments providing that
it found jurisdiction.
70 See Title 22, Sec. 201 of the D.C. Code.
71 Vuitch, at 1034.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 1035.
74
75
76

Id.

Vuitch, at 1035.

Id.
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In his opinion Judge Gesell also discussed the effect of the equal
protection clause on abortion, an issue that had not been analyzed in
Belous. Noting that abortions are more liberally performed in private
hospitals than in city hospitals, he expressed the opinion that "Principles
of Equal Protection under our constitution require that policies in our
public hospitals be liberalized immediately." 7
Another recent federal district court case, Babbitz v. McCann7" dealt
with an abortion statute similar to the 1872 California law and the present federal law.7" In this case, the three-judge court found that the statute was not vague. However, it did say the state needed a compelling interest to regulate "the right to privacy in home, sex, and marriage.""0
It specifically did not find such an interest in the need to protect the
health of the mother,"' nor in discouraging promiscuity. 2 In regard

to the rights of the fetus, the court stated, "When measured against the
claimed 'rights' of an embryo of four months or less, we hold that the
mother's right transcends that of such an embryo." (Emphasis added.) 3
The court concluded:
Under its police power, a state can regulate certain aspects of
abortion. Thus, it is permissible for the state to require that abortions be conducted by qualified physicians. The police power of
the state does not, however, entitle it to deny a woman the basic
right reserved to her under the Ninth Amendment to decide whether
she should carry or reject an embryo which has not yet quickened.
Wisconsin statute suffer from
The challenged sections of the present
84
an infirmity of fatal overbreadth.
Thus, in the two recent federal district court cases there is not only a
recognition of the right of the woman to choose whether or not to bear
children, as in Belous,8 5 but also a greater recognition than in Belous
of the probable right of the state to regulate abortion in two areas: (1)
its performance by licensed physicians only; 6 and (2) its performance
within a specified time limit in the course of the pregnancy.8 7
77
78

Id.

310 F. Supp. 293 (1970).
1970, refused to review this case.

The United States Supreme Court, on Oct. 12,

79 See Wisc. STAT. § 940.04(5).
80 310 F. Supp., at 297.
81 Id. at 300.
82
83
84

Id.
Id.
Id. at 302.

85 In a recent Arizona court case (State of Arizona v. Keevers, 458 P.2d 974

(1969), rehearingdenied Oct. 20, 1969) the court skirted the critical constitutional is-

sues and found instead that there was no proof beyond a reasonable doubt (though
a Gravindex test had been found positive) that the complainant was pregnant; and
therefore one of the essential elements of the crime was missing.
86 Babbitz, 310 F. Supp. 293, also suggests it should only be performed in hospitals and clinics.
87 This latter aspect of abortion regulation could be based on a compelling inter-

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 2

ConstitutionalStatus of California's1967 Abortion Act
Notwithstanding the importance of the cases discussed above to the
development of abortion case law, it must be remembered that each
holding was determinative of only the most restrictive type of abortion

law (i.e., those similar to California's Penal Code section 274 of 1872).
The constitutionality of the abortion laws based on the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code still remains to be determined. The issues,
however, are the same.

In regard to vagueness, the Belous court, though it expressly stated
it was deciding only the validity of the 1872 law,88 suggested a test it felt
would comply with the requisite test of certainty. The court stated that
the test of the Therapeutic Abortion Act is analogous to its suggested

test.8 9 The test would be a "medical" one, i.e., an abortion would be
illegal when the risk of death from abortion would be greater than
the risk from live birth

0°

Apparently the court felt that such a

determination could be made by the medical profession with the
necessary degree of certainty. However, since the court itself recognized

that "it is now safer for a woman to have a hospital therapeutic abortion during the first trimester than to bear a child,"" the necessity for
having the test at all is, practically speaking, eliminated. Nearly all

abortion requests (except in the most bizarre circumstances) would have
to be approved, and there would be no need for a committee of doctors
to pass on the abortion. Therefore, even if the test of the Therapeutic

Abortion Act were found certain enough to satisfy the due process
clause, it would be difficult to square such a test with the intent of the

legislature in enacting the therapeutic abortion law.

In view of all

the limitations and procedural prerequisites incorporated into the Act, 2
est of the state in the health of the mother (as "late" abortions more nearly approach
the risk rate of live birth), or in protecting the rights of the fetus. It seems to shock
the conscience less to destroy an embryo in the early stages of development than in the
later when it might be capable of independent life. In Foster v. State, 182 Wisc. 295,
301-302, 196 N.W. 233, 235 (1923), the court said:
That it should be less of an offense to destroy an embryo in a stage where
human life in its common acceptance was not yet begun than to destroy a
quick child, is a conclusion that commends itself to most men.
Such a time limitation would probably best be an arbitrary one (a certain specified
number of weeks) for ease of administration. Any conflict over the time of conception could easily be resolved by factual and expert testimony.
88 Belous 366, n.15.
89 Id. at 364.
90 Id.

91 Id. at 360-361; also at 361, n.7.

02 In most cases, that the abortion be approved by a hospital staff committee,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25951 (c) (1); and, since most applications (over

92%) are based on mental health reasons, that in these cases the woman be shown
to be dangerous to herself or to . . . others . . . . CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25954. This last requirement in effect necessitates the approval of at least one
psychiatrist.
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it appears that the legislature did not intend abortions to be easily obtainable in the first trimester.
In spite of the fact that the test the court considers certain enough
might not coincide with legislative intent, it is possible the same court
or the United States Supreme Court might find the 1967 test, upon further examination, not certain enough to satisfy the due process clause.
One Los Angeles Municipal Court case, People v. Robb,93 decided
in January, 1970, has already held the 1967 Therapeutic Abortion Act
void for vagueness. Judge Paul Mast, in dismissing the charges brought

against Dr. Robb under the Act, found that, though most of the statute
was definite and certain the part which refers to mental illness "to the
extent that the woman is dangerous to herself or to the person or property of others, or is in need of supervision or restraint" is:
• . . completely without meaning and offers no guide whatsoever
by which a person can determine what is permitted and what is
prohibited. Does supervision mean in an institution, by a psychiatrist, at home? What does dangerous to herself mean? What
94
does restraint mean?
Judge Mast found these words had "no meaning certain enough to
apprise a person what conduct is prohibited"; 95 therefore, the statute
was void for vagueness.
In other states with statutes similar to California's the same questions
are being raised. Dr. William Goddard, a Denver obstetrician and
gynecologist, filed suit asking that the Colorado statute be declared unconstitutional. In his complaint he alleged that Colorado's law was too
difficult, if not impossible, to administer. 9 6
Related to the issue of vagueness, as discussed under Belous, is the
question of unconstitutional delegation of decision-making power. The
possibility of the statute's vague language placing an undue burden on
the hospital committees and physicians in interpreting the law could be
considered lacking definite guidelines in the statute (as the Robb
case held) 97 and therefore grounds for holding the statute unconstitutional.
93 A copy of the decision [hereinafter cited as Robb) may be obtained by writing
to Municipal Court, Central Orange County Judicial District, 700 West Eighth Street,
Santa Ana, California 92701.
In June of 1970, another municipal court judge in the same district, Judge William

W. Thomson, held in a ruling that the state did have the right to regulate abortion to
the extent abortions be performed before 20 weeks, by a physician in a hospital or

clinic; but that the state cannot deny a woman's right to decide whether or not to bear
children. A copy of the opinion in this latter case, People v. Gwynne, may be obtained by writing the Central Orange County Judicial District at the above address.
94 Robb 7.
95 Id.
96 New York Times, Apr. 13, 1970, at 20, col. 1.
97

Robb 5-6.
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Two other grounds on which California's Therapeutic Abortion Act
may be attacked are overbreadth and lack of compelling state interest

in the regulation of abortion. Overbreadth, in the case of abortion law,
appears to be closely allied to the fundamental right theory. For instance, if a fundamental right is found (either of privacy in relation to
matters of marriage, family and sex or of a woman to decide whether or

not to bear children),98 the critical issue is whether the state has a compelling interest in the regulation of that right. 9 If a compelling interest
is found, the state may only regulate the right by legislation that is narrowly drawn and not of "unlimited and indiscriminate sweep."' 0 The
regulation must be "necessary... to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."' 01
In view of the above discussion of recent case law and the trend of the
more recent state statutes,10 2 one could conclude that a woman does
have a fundamental right to choose whether or not to bear children.
However, this conclusion has yet to be accepted by the United States
Supreme Court.
The identification of a compelling state interest that would justify the
regulation of the right to abortion is much more complicated. Under its
police power, the state has an accepted power to regulate constitutional
rights for the protection of the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. 10 3 The state has a clear interest in protecting the health"' of the

mother. But as pointed out above, abortions, at least in the first trimester, have been proven to present less danger to the life and health of
the mother than a live birth, 10 it would appear that the state would have

no legitimate interest in regulating early abortions other than to insist
they be performed by physicians in hospitals or clinics. 106
98 See note 42 supra.

99 See note 45 supra.
100 Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).

101 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).

102 Those of Maryland, Hawaii, Alaska, and New York.

103 This power is reserved to the states, as sovereignties, under the tenth amendment of the Constitution. For a definition of state police power, see Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
104 The World Health Organization in 1960 defined health as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well being, not simply the absence of illness and
disease." As quoted in MiETus, THE THERmAEtic ABORTION AcT 71 (1967).
See note 46 supra.
106 Even the latter limitation, that abortions be performed in hospitals or clinics,

105

might become obsolete (see New York's law, note 134 infra, where the atmosphere of
the procedure is left to the discretion of the physician, as it is with regard to any
surgical procedure. However, New York is still wrestling with this problem; see
New York Times, July 15, 1970, at 24, col. 4.)
The argument that the state has an interest in prohibiting abortions because they
are damaging to the mental health of the woman has been largely discredited. See
Kummer, Post-Abortion Psychiatric Illness-A Myth? 119 AM. J. PSYCHiAT. 980-983
(1963); and Leveneau and Rigney, The Law, Preventive Psychiatry and Therapeutic
Abortion, paper presented to A.P.A. meeting, Miami Beach, Fla., Apr. 1969.
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Another possible compelling interest suggested as justifying state regulation is the interest of the state in protecting the life of the unborn.
Belous seems to diminish such an interest' 07 though Vuitch and Babbitz do not.10 8 More recent state laws have recognized a protectable
right of the fetus after some stage in its development, putting some time
limit on the period during the pregnancy when a woman may obtain an
abortion.'0 9 In the Robb case Judge Mast, following .Belous, stated
that the law generally did not recognize fetal rights as being equal to
human rights unless a child was subsequently born alive. 110 He further added that to hold that human life begins at conception (in other
words, that the state could regulate abortion from that time on in order
to protect the rights of the fetus) would be to "adopt the philosophy of
one of the country's major religions, an act which clearly would be in
violation of the first amendment to the United States Constitution.""'
A middle course, which would seem to be acceptable to a majority of
Americans, would be to acknowledge the rights of the fetus, as did the
common law, once quickening has occurred. 1 2 After quickening, or at
least viability, abortion could be proscribed under the tenet of protecting the rights of the fetus and the health of the mother. However, any
other regulation of early abortion, such as the requirement of some special health need of the mother or the approval of a committee of hospital
physicians, would be questionable since, as pointed out previously, there
is probably no compelling state interest in regulating such aspects of
abortion. Under such a rationale, the Therapeutic Abortion Act would
be void under the fundamental right theory, or for overbreadth because
the regulation applies to aspects of abortion in which no compelling state
interest can be identified.
The final grounds on which the Therapeutic Abortion Act might be
held unconstitutional, a denial of equal protection of the law, has been
explored in Robb. The court expressed that an improper delegation of
decision-making power similar to that in the Therapeutic Abortion Act
In an article in 111

CALIFORNIA MEDICINE

318-320 (Oct., 1969), Dr. Catherine

Pike reviews the studies of the psychiatric problems of aborted women. She states,
"Unwanted pregnancy causes one of the most severe psychological stresses in a woman's life" (at 318); and concludes, "It seems, therefore, that abortion may prove to
be the best course of the alternatives available to a patient" (at 320).
107

See note 54 supra.

108 See notes 73 and 81 supra.
109 California's present 20 week limitation is the time at which quickening is
likely to occur. However, since viability would seem to be a time at which the state
has a more compelling interest in limiting the mother's right to abortion in order to
protect the fetus, perhaps the 24-week limitation, as in New York's law, is more sound.
110 Robb 9.
11 Id.
112 See Means, note 48 supra; and the quotation from Foster v. State, note 87
supra.
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tends to promote, in application if not on the face of the statute, unequal
protection of the rights of citizens under the Constitution.'1 3 For instance, where guidelines are indefinite, the statute can be administered
differently in different areas. The statistics collected by the State Department of Public Health demonstrate marked differences in geographical and hospital distribution of therapeutic abortions.
For example, the San Francisco Bay Area, with 22% of the live
births, accounted for 63% of the legal abortions in 1969; the Los

Angeles Metropolitan Area, with 44% of the live births, accounted for
only 18% of the legal abortions. 11 4 According to the Executive Director of the Sacramento Planned Parenthood Association, Mr. William
Musladin, there are only five areas in California where abortions are
relatively simple to obtain-San Francisco (including Palo Alto), San
Diego, Santa Barbara, Oakland, and Sacramento." 9 The Public Health
Report pointed out that eight hospitals performed 40% of the legal abortions in 1968, although they accounted for only 8% of the live births. I1'
With respect to county hospital statistics, of California's 77 county
hospitals, 36 are not accredited and thereby prohibited from performing abortions. Of these 36, only 20 have maternity services. Patients
"utilizing county hospital services in these areas would have unusual
difficulties in obtaining a therapeutic abortion."" 7 However, in the
accredited hospitals the five hospitals with the highest ratios of abortions per live births accounted for an overall rate of 111.3 abortions per
1,000 live births. The five with the lowest ratios averaged only 1.5-a
74-fold difference between the high and low groups.1 18 The report concluded that "as county hospital patients have little or no alternatives for
obtaining care, this marked variation merits further study.""'
The
20
poor, of course, account for the majority of county hospital patients.
Those women with enough money and knowledge to obtain referrals
to the more liberal private hospitals have, as these figures point out, a
distinct advantage under the Therapeutic Abortion Act.
Even in Sacramento where therapeutic abortions are relatively easy to
2
obtain, the figures show that not all applications are approved.'
113
114

Robb 6. See also notes 35 and 97 supra.
PUBLIC HEALTH REPORT 2.

115 Interview in Sacramento, July, 1970. The figures of the
PORT corroborate this information.
116

PUBLIC HEALTH

RE-

PUBLIC HEALTH REPORT 2.

117 Id. at 3.

118 Id.
19 Id.

120 The special problem of the poor obtaining abortions on a national level is discussed in Abortion Law Reform at the Crossroads?supra note 42.
121 In the Sacramento Valley in 1969, 92-939o of applications received resulted

in abortions being performed (PUBLIC HEALTH REPORT, Table 2).

1971 / Therapeutic Abortion Act

Since mental health accounted for 92% of the applications statewide
in 1969,122 it was mandatory that, in the case of county hospitals, these
applicants go through the mental health clinic prior to final approval.
At this level, whether an applicant receives approval or not often depends on which doctor examines her. 123 If the patient is turned down,

she is allowed to go through the clinic once more in an attempt to obtain a different result. Or, there is the possibility of the final hospital
committee's over-ruling the psychiatrist's recommendation.
In general, in regard to satisfying the equal protection clause, the
1970 Public Health Report found that the inequalities were decreasing
gradually during the 1 three-year period from 1967 to 1970 and are
"slowly disappearing.' 24 Such a trend could eliminate the question of
whether the Act, as applied, constitutes a denial of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 125
The New State Laws:
Starting in March, 1970, four states have moved'toward more permissive and perhaps more constitutional abortion legislation. Hawaii was
the first. Its new law has done away with the requirement of a hospital
committee approval and the necessity of some threat to the health of
the mother from continuation of the pregnancy. Any woman may now
obtain an abortion in Hawaii with only the four following requirements:
The abortion must be performed (1) by a licensed physician (2) in a
licensed hospital (3) before the fetus becomes viable (4) only on
women who have been residents of Hawaii for 90 days. 12 6 The latter
requirement was included to prevent a heavy influx of applicants from
other states which Hawaii's facilities might not have the capacity to
12 7
handle.
In April, New York passed a bill permitting abortions up to the 24th
week of pregnancy (the time of viability) if performed by a licensed
122 PUBLIc HEALTH REPORT 1.
123

Interview with Dr. James L. Poindexter. Sacramento obstetrician and gyne-

cologist, July, 1970. Dr. Poindexter is a Diplomat of the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology, and is vice-president of the Planned Parenthood Association of

Sacramento.
124
125

PUBLIC HEALTH REPORT 5.

Regarding the cost of abortion, it is interesting to note that the average

abortion costs between $500 and $700, even when the hospital stay is limited to less than
a day (that is, 4 hours post-general anesthesia). The doctor's fees account for
about $320. The fee for the doctor performing the abortion is usually $200, the
psychiatrist's $65. Of the $320 for doctors' fees, Medi-Cal pays $21 for the first
office visit and $120 for the surgery itself. According to Dr. Poindexter, most doctors write off the rest of the fee on their Medi-Cal patients.
126 HAWAI REV. STATS., c. 768, as amended, 1970.
127

HAvAII

HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

3, at 6, Feb. 19, 1970.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT

No.
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physician.! 2s There is no residency requirement nor any requirement
that abortions be performed in licensed hospitals and clinics. This law
piesumably would allow abortions to be done in doctors' offices considerably reducing the cost.12 ' The places where abortions could be performed would be left to the discretion of the medical profession or local
boards of health, as it is for any other surgical procedure.
Shortly after New York's law was passed, the Alaska Legislature overiode its Governor's veto to pass a bill, similar to Hawaii's, permitting
abortion if performed in a hospital by a licensed physician on a nonviable fetus, and the woman has been a state resident for 90 days.13 0
The Maryland Legislature also sent to its Governor a bill that was
perhaps the most permissive of all in that it contained no time limit for
performing the abortion and no residency requirement.1 31 It merely
stated that any termination of a human pregnancy constitutes the practice of medicine and that such acts may only be performed by licensed
physicians within licensed hospitals.
Conclusion-andRecommendation:

California's 1967 Therapeutic Abortion Act, in the light of the above
discussion, does not seem to be constitutional on any one of several
grounds.132 With, (1) the number of American women asserting,
either legally or illegally, their right to decide whether or not to bear children and (2) the high degree of safety to the health of women who
have early abortions performed by licensed physicians, it would seem
that a workable abortion law should be devised that would be permissible under our constitution.
What, then, would be a workable, valid law? If one grants the fundamental fight of a woman to decide whether or not to bear children,
which seems inevitable at this point in history, then the only interests the
state would have in regulating that right would be to protect the health
of the woman and possibly to protect the rights of a viable, or "quick,"
fetus. These two interests would justify requiring abortions to be done
See note 134 infra.
However, local Boards of Health could promulgate certain local restrictions.
The problem of restricting abortions to licensed hospitals was brought before the New
York City Board of Health in several hearings during the Summer of 1970. The consensus of opinion at those hearings seemed to be that the matter should be left to the
discretion of the physician (New York Times, July 15, 1970, at 24, col. 4).
130 Lader, A National Guide to Legal Abortion, LADIES HOME JOURNAL, August,
1970.
. 131 See House Bill 489, Maryland, 1970. This bill has since been vetoed by the
Governor of Maryland.
132 And probably, therefore, the laws of the other nine states basing their abortion laws on the Model Penal Code, e.g., Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia,
Kansas, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and West Virginia.
128
120
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by licensed physicians, and setting an arbitrary (for ease of administra-

tion) time limit during the pregnancy within which an abortion could

be obtained, preferably until the time of viability.' 3 3 It is difficult to
see how the nature of the right and the interests of the state at this time

could justify any further regulation.
New York's newly enacted abortion law, which went into effect on
July 1, 1970, essentially incorporates the above two regulations and

nothing more.

It is carefully drafted, in contrast to Maryland's bill

and there is no residency requirement as in Hawaii's and Alaska's laws.

For these reasons, New York's law could well serve as a model for a3 4new

California abortion law and therefore is reproduced in toto below.1
Needless to say, great interest and attention has been focused on the
abortion question during the last five years. A state trend for liberalizing legal abortions, set by the New York Legislature' 3 5 and the California
and federal courts may now be in swing; however, it remains for the state

supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court to say what abortion law is constitutional.
Nancy Briggs Reardan

133 See note 87 supra.
134 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 125.05, subsection 3, as amended 1970, reads:
An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that
such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from
the commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission of an
abortional act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a
duly licensed physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or,
(2) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy.
The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she
believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician acting under
a reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within
twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. This act
shall take effect July first, 1970.
131 After the first week of operation of New York's 1970 abortion law the New
York Times stated that several chiefs of obstetrics reported that initial problems were
rapidly being ironed out. New York Times, July 5, 1970, Sec. IV, at 12, col. 4-5.
See also quotation of Dr. Shirley A. Mayer, assistant commissioner of maternal and
child 'care services at the Health Dept. of New York in the New York Times, July 1,
1970, at 36, col. 1; and figures in article of the New York Times, July 16, 1970, at
24, col. 2.

